

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BERLIN 01982 01 OF 02 202016Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10
CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-10 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03
NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01
DOE-15 CEQ-01 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 OMB-01 TRSE-00
NRC-05 /160 W

-----064298 202026Z /41

R 201658Z MAR 78
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6968
INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION USBERLIN
USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 01982

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, GE
SUBJECT: GDR POLICIES ON DISARMAMENT

1. SUMMARY: AT THE UPCOMING SPECIAL SESSION ON
DISARMAMENT (SSOD) THE GDR CAN BE EXPECTED LOYALLY
TO FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE SOVIET UNION IN DISARMAMENT
QUESTIONS, GIVING SPECIAL ATTENTION AND EFFORT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BERLIN 01982 01 OF 02 202016Z

TO THE BLOC'S PROPOSED CONVENTION TO BAN NEUTRON
WEAPONS, AND WILL ACTIVELY SUPPORT SOVIET PROPOSALS
ON MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS (MDW), NON-USE OF FORCE
(NUF), CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW), COMPREHENSIVE TEST
BAN (CTB) AND THE CONVENING OF A WORLD
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY.

2. WE ANTICIPATE THAT GDR PARTICIPATION IN THE UPCOMING UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT WILL BE ACTIVE AND WILL RECEIVE CONSIDERABLE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION IN THE EAST GERMAN MEDIA. WHILE THE GDR WILL PROBABLY PORTRAY ITSELF AS AN INDEPENDENT VOICE AT THE SSOD, WE EXPECT IT TO SUPPORT ALL SOVIET INITIATIVES WHILE GIVING SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THOSE AFFECTING THE MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE WOULD THEREFORE EXPECT THAT THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF EAST GERMAN EFFORTS WILL BE IN SUPPORT OF A BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEUTRON WEAPONS, A FORMAL STATEMENT ON NON-USE OF FORCE, A CONVENTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND A FORMAL BAN ON NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

3. THERE FOLLOWS A SUMMARY OF GDR DISARMAMENT POSITIONS:

(A) DETENTE - THE GDR CAN BE EXPECTED TO ARGUE THAT PROGRESS IN DETENTE AND A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT AND SPIRIT OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT ARE THE ESSENTIAL FOUNDATIONS FOR PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT. THE GDR WILL FOLLOW THE SOVIET LEAD IN IMPUGNING US MOTIVES AND ACTIONS ON DETENTE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BERLIN 01982 01 OF 02 202016Z

(B) NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) - THE GDR WILL LIKELY SUPPORT A FORMAL STATEMENT ON NUF CALLING FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY TO COME OUT OF THE 31ST UNGA. IF THE SOVIETS CHOOSE TO GIVE PRIORITY ATTENTION TO THE ADDITIONAL QUESTION OF NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE GDR WILL PROBABLY FOLLOW SUIT

(C) NEUTRON WEAPONS (RB/ER'S) - WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE GDR WILL BE OUT IN FRONT IN THE CAMPAIGN FOR A FORMAL BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SO-CALLED "NUCLEAR NEUTRON WEAPONS," IT IS LIKELY THAT EAST GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES WILL ATTEMPT TO USE THE NEUTRON BOMB QUESTION IN AN ATTEMPT TO REBUT AND UNDERCUT THE US ON OTHER DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS DURING THE SSOD BY ACCUSING THE US OF HYPOCRISY AND DUPLICITY IN DEVELOPING THIS "INHUMANE WEAPON." BASED ON GDR MEDIA TREATMENT OF THIS ISSUE IN RECENT MONTHS, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE GDR FEELS THAT IT HAS AN EXPLOITABLE ISSUE IN THE NEUTRON BOMB.

(D) MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS (MDW) - THE GDR CAN BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT SOVIET PROPOSALS

ON MDW ALTHOUGH WE WOULD EXPECT THAT IT WILL DEFER
TO THE SOVIETS TO EXPLAIN WHAT THE PROPOSAL ACTUALLY
MEANS.

(E) CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) - THE GDR WILL
PROBABLY SUPPORT THE JOINT US-GDR EFFORTS ON CW WITHIN
THE CCD.

(F) COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB). WE EXPECT
THE GDR TO SUPPORT US-USSR EFFORTS TO REACH
A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. IF THESE NEGOTIATIONS
DO NOT PROGRESS FAST ENOUGH FOR SOVIET TASTE, WE
EXPECT THE GDR TO REINFORCE ANY STATEMENTS THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BERLIN 01982 02 OF 02 202018Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10
CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-10 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03
NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01
DOE-15 CEQ-01 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 OMB-01 TRSE-00
NRC-05 /160 W

-----064312 202026Z /41

R 201658Z MAR 78
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6969
INFO AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION USBERLIN
USMISSION USNATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BERLIN 01982

SOVIET DELEGATION MAY MAKE ON THE ISSUE AT THE SSOD.

(G) WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. THE GDR WILL PROBABLY SUPPORT CONTINUATION OF EFFORTS WITHIN THE CCD BUT SIMULTANEOUSLY SUPPORT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE IN ORDER TO BRING THE PRC AND FRANCE INTO ANY DISCUSSIONS OF REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BERLIN 01982 02 OF 02 202018Z

CTB, REDUCTIONS OF MILITARY BUDGETS, ETC.

(H) NON-PROLIFERATION. THE GDR HAS NOT GIVEN MUCH ATTENTION TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION QUESTION PER SE, PREFERRING TO DEAL WITH THE BROADER QUESTION OF REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS, LIMITATIONS ON TESTING, ETC. ALONG THE SOVIET MODEL. IT DOES, OF COURSE, HAVE A MAJOR INTEREST IN PREVENTING THE FRG FROM EVER BECOMING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE AND HAS VIEWED THE PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION OF A WEST GERMAN NUCLEAR MATERIALS (NON-MILITARY) STORAGE SITE NEAR THE INNER-GERMAN BORDER WITH CONCERN. THE GDR HAS TAKEN A POSITIVE STANCE ON THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES AND WE WOULD EXPECT IT TO BE AS FORTHCOMING ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION QUESTION AS ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN EASTERN EUROPE.

4. WHILE IT IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT THE GDR WOULD DEPART ON ANY POINT OF SUBSTANCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION AT THE SSOD, WE WOULD THINK THAT THE GDR DELEGATION MAY BE A USEFUL CONTACT POINT FOR DISCUSSIONS ON ISSUES DIRECTLY AFFECTING THE MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY EMPLOY THE GDR DELEGATION TO FLOAT AN OCCASIONAL TRIAL BALLOON DURING THE SSOD. THE GDR ITSELF WILL CERTAINLY BE INTERESTED IN PLAYING AN ACTIVE ROLE, IF ONLY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT IS A FULLY PARTICIPATING MEMBER OF THE UN AND TO SHOW OTHER DELEGATIONS THAT THERE ARE TWO GERMAN VOICES TO BE LISTENED TO IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. BOLEN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, DISARMAMENT
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978BERLIN01982
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780123-0137
Format: TEL
From: BERLIN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780349/aaaabpdj.tel
Line Count: 213
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 2059f2c3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3273639
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: GDR POLICIES ON DISARMAMENT
TAGS: PARM, GC
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/2059f2c3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014